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Saturday 15 October 2011

Masterly inactivity

With the British National Party Ideas Conference now only a week away, the minds of BNP members, both past and present, are no doubt concentrated on determining the best way forward for our party and the nationalist movement as a whole.

Having reviewed the history of the movement since the end of the Second World War, it seems to me that nationalism has suffered from two major fault-lines running through it, right up to the present day.

The first is the question, still a vexed one, of nationalism versus populism (or 'culturalism').  The second is the question of authoritarianism versus democracy.  These fault-lines intersect, but paradoxically not in the way that perhaps might have been expected.  Most of the populists (or 'culturalists') favour authoritarianism, while most of the nationalists (a rather smaller number) favour democracy.

I should perhaps at this point state that I regard myself as a nationalist who favours democracy, while I would regard Mr Griffin, for example, as a populist who favours authoritarianism.

These two ideological dimensions, namely nationalism - populism and authoritarianism - democracy, have been the ostensible source of numerous schisms and secessions over the past two generations.  The schisms and the secessions have effectively been self-defeating for the movement, if success is to be defined as, if not governing the country ourselves, at least having our key policies properly implemented by others.

I say these ideological differences have been the ostensible source of schisms and secessions because there is, I suggest, always another source or factor in play, which acts as a catalyst or accelerant.  That is, the very human desire to get one's own way and to safeguard one's own position against a challenge by potential rivals.

All political parties are coalitions of individuals who come together for collective action because they believe they have more in common with their colleagues than they would have with others.  Naturally, one will find some colleagues more congenial than others.  Some, one would not be likely to associate with were it not that they were party colleagues.  The same situation pertains in any work-place.

Very rarely, fortunately, one may find that one is faced with a matter of principle which requires one to leave a party, or a job, for that matter.  Usually, certainly in the case of a party, one's natural inclination is to stay, to work for progress from within and to hope for better days.

I regard the unification which led to the formation of the National Front, in 1967, as having been a great and positive achievement of nationalism, one which both John Tyndall and John Bean played no small part in bringing to fruition.

In the late 1970s it really did look as though that party was on the verge of an electoral breakthrough, with increasingly promising election results and growing media attention.

In some ways the situation post 2010 parallels the situation post 1979.  In the general election campaign of each of these years the premier nationalist party of the day over-extended itself, having aroused inflated and unrealistic expectations amongst its activists, and then went down in a welter of factious blood-letting.  Prior to the 2010 general election I took the liberty of writing to Mr Griffin suggesting that it would be financially prudent not to field more than about 160 parliamentary candidates.  In the event the party actually fielded 336, fewer than one in four of whom saved their £500 deposit.

Mr Tyndall, in an article published in Spearhead in April 2005, (entitled 'New Party A Non-Starter')made a cogent plea for nationalist unity.  He asked all members of the BNP to stay with the party, regardless of how badly they were treated by its leadership.  He made this altruistic plea as someone who had both founded the party and been expelled from it by the man he had been grooming to be his successor.  Indeed, he was expelled twice from the BNP by Mr Griffin (being reinstated once after court proceedings) and was in that state of exile when he wrote the article selflessly recommending that others stay within the BNP and not attempt to set up a new party, or parties.

Mr Tyndall knew, from his more than forty years' experience of the movement, that '...it is the BNP or nothing'.  He knew that no other party could grow and thrive under the shadow of the BNP.  We have seen Mr Tyndall's prediction verified on several occasions only recently.  He even acknowledged that his own departure from the National Front in 1980 and formation of the BNP in 1982, might have been a mistake, in hindsight.

Any party, but particularly any nationalist party, requires a certain critical mass of members before it is able to make any significant impression on the consciousness of the electorate.  If it is fortunate enough ever to reach that stage then it is going to have both a 'left wing' and a 'right wing'.  If the two wings of the party cannot learn to coexist in reasonable harmony then the electorate is most unlikely to find the party very appealing, and it may well simply disintegrate into two or more ineffectual sects, as happened to the National Front during the 1980s.  Keeping a political party united is, of course, one of the most crucially important tasks of its leader.  Some leaders are more adept than others when it comes to this aspect of leadership.

Andrew Brons MEP has added his own caveat in an article ('Proposals for a New Political Movement') published on the BNP Ideas web site, on 24 August, in which he refers to an "iron law" of political parties.  Andrew perspicaciously points out the improbability of any breakaway party ever overtaking the BNP, with its household name brand recognition, and its thousands of armchair members, while the BNP remains operational. 

However, to quote Andrew, "It is highly likely that the current leadership will drive the Party into the ground so that it ceases to exist as an active political party."

I'm reminded of a line from the hit sit-com Yes, Minister, where the minister, Jim Hacker, turns to his permanent secretary, Sir Humphrey, and says "Well, we must do something.  We can't just do nothing!"  Sir Humphrey replies "Why not?  It's usually best".

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