Today's 'extremism' is tomorrow's orthodoxy

As the old system slides ever further into anarchy and chaos, the moment for the emergence of a dynamic new force in British politics draws nearer.  Can we establish such a force and win political power in the time left to us?  In affirming that we can, I am in no doubt as to the formidable obstacles that first have to be overcome.

The first and most obvious of these is the entrenched power of the interests against which we fight.  While these enemies have shown complete ineptitude in governing and managing Britain, they are highly organised and capable when it comes to defending their own positions and institutions against any movement of real change.  Something of the workings of this system of power and corruption I have attempted to reveal in this book.

The second major obstacle is a strong indisposition on the part of many British people, not only towards political action, but towards political radicalism of any kind.  This observation is today true of white, western peoples generally but it is particularly true of our own people.

A consequence of this national temperament is that great political changes, when they occur in our country, do not occur quickly.  The first Labour government in Britain, for instance, was formed in 1924.  The idea of British Socialism, however, had been present in these islands for much longer, its development extending back into the distant mists of the 19th century.

It will be clear from what I have said earlier that British Nationalism as an idea is by no means new.  It is only new as an instrument of action, in which role it has yet to be applied.  Earlier in this book I have given accounts of its early infancy in the pre-1914 period, its coming to maturity between the wars and its revival after the Second World War.  British Nationalism, like British Socialism, has been no overnight growth.

It would be wholly wrong to draw from this, as some pessimists do, that because nationalism has not in all these years achieved political power, or even won widespread mass support, it cannot do so in the future.  Such a conclusion would be as mistaken now as it was about socialism earlier this century.

The pioneers of socialism had to wait with patience for their moment of destiny, allowing natural historical forces to make possible the advent of socialism as a power factor in Britain.  The important thing is that, when that moment arrived, socialists had ready the political machine needed to exploit it, and thus turn into a potent political force what had previously only been an idea and a vision in the minds of a comparative few.

Exactly the same rule governs the coming of the moment of destiny for our own movement.

I have emphasised earlier that all great historical changes in societies are brought about, not by masses, but by highly organised minorities.

If a particular political ideology has no mass support, it is not necessarily because there is no disposition within the mass to support it; rather is it much more likely to be because there simply is not a sufficiently strong and organised minority to provide the apparatus by which such support can be mobilised.

A very high proportion of the population may hold opinions on current issues which are in accord with the policies of a particular reforming movement; but that does not mean that that movement is certain to enjoy practical support in the same proportion.  If it does not possess the necessary organisational apparatus - and the popular confidence for it to be considered a power factor in the politics of the nation, its support will be mostly silent and passive; it will not be translated either into mass membership or large numbers of votes.

There is another factor of enormous importance.  There is a deep-rooted timidity, even cowardice, in the masses which inhibits them from supporting any cause which, while on the one hand seeming to be highly controversial and attracting strident opposition, does not on the other hand seem to have powerful forces working for it to defend it in this controversy and combat such opposition.

This is a strange and interesting phenomenon.  In times of war, large numbers of people from out of a mass of the population can be capable of displaying a high order of courage, with many men, young and not so young, willing to risk their lives in battle, and many of all ages and both sexes on the home front showing great fortitude in the face of bombing and the several privations that attend their lives in such a situation.

Yet these same people, even including men who have been fighter pilots or tank or submarine commanders, can become petrified rabbits in the face of pressures to conform to the current political orthodoxies and to avoid identification with any brand of politics deemed to be current heresy.  This paradox is particularly common among Anglo-Saxons.

I am certain that it is this factor that lies behind the customary protestation by many British people that they are against any form of political 'extremism'.

In an earlier chapter I looked a little into the question of 'extremism' and identified the term as an entirely relative one, the meaning of which is determined by those in a position to fix the central location on the map of politics and thereby decide what is to be the ruling 'orthodoxy'.  If tomorrow these masters changed, and a new 'orthodoxy' became the vogue, the masses in Britain, and probably any other Anglo-Saxon country, would find no difficulty whatever in embracing it.  That which had been yesterday's 'extremism' would today become a quite respectable viewpoint!

In fact, what we have today is the maintenance of an entirely artificial climate of opinion by means of the creation of an atmosphere of fear.  In this respect Britain has become similar to the very 'totalitarian' countries to which she is always proclaiming herself morally superior.

Lurking in the minds of many millions are feelings of discontent about present policies, deepening into disgust with the whole established order.  But these feelings are largely suppressed due to the psychological intimidation of the state machine and its various agencies, of which the mass media are by far the most important.

Tyndall, J  The Eleventh Hour, Third Edition, 1998, Welling: Albion Press, pp 523-5